Category Archives: Indigenous Peoples

Writing Elsewhere

I’ve been writing elsewhere than this blog in recent months, much of it appearing in Indian Country Today. The focus is on sharpening and heightening the critique of federal Indian law in the face of increasing anti-Indian uses of that body of law by the US Supreme Court.

For example, here’s a three column series in Indian Country Today analyzing federal Indian ‘trust doctrine’ in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court decision denying compensation to the Navajo Nation for decades of underpaid coal extraction pursuant to federally approved leases [United States v. Navajo Nation, (2009)]:

“Navajo Nation, known as an ‘Indian tribe'” – ICT, April 15, 2009
“Can federal Indian ‘trust’ be trusted?” – ICT, April 22, 2009
“The sands of federal ‘trust'” – ICT, April 29, 2009

The columns have garnered a variety of comments and have been reprinted and linked to by other writers. I am happy to be part of a rethinking of these matters.

Economic strength through land theft and war?

Reviewing Jeff Madrick’s The Case for Big Government in The New York Review [“Government Beyond Obama?“], Richard Parker writes that the influence of government’s share of GDP from the American Revolution to the Great Depression was “quite small,” but had a “disproportionately large” influence on the economy. [NYR, 12 March 2009, 38]

Parker’s analysis of the federal role in this period is that

…upon organization of the Northwest Territory in 1789, the federal government became the nation’s largest landowner—a fact not reflected in conventional GDP calculations. And over the next century and a half the federal government was able to shape economic growth through its land distribution policies: for example, it used sales and leases of its land to foster small-scale farming, promote free primary (and later higher) education, encourage forestry and mining, and finance the nation’s vast transportation network.

When we recall a fact not reflected in conventional history — that the lands over which the federal government asserted control were Indian lands, not public domain — we get a sharper and less pleasing view of the federal role in boosting the economy in that 150 years. It was land theft.

For example, Lincoln’s economic policies resulted in huge areas of Indian land being opened to colonization. States were granted 71 million acres. Another 85 million acres were awarded to homesteaders under the 1862 Homestead Act. Yet another 155 million acres of Indian lands, including “rights of way and alternate sections of non-mineral bearing lands,” were “granted outright” to “corporate interests which undertook to finance the construction of the transcontinental railroad.” [Jennings C. Wise, The Red Man in the New World Drama (1971), New York: Macmillan, 260].

Parker criticizes Madrick for ignoring “effects of American foreign and military policies on economic growth. Between 1945 and 1975—the period Madrick cites so approvingly in contrast to the decades that followed—half of all federal spending was for the military, and significant parts of the rest (including for education, roads, science, and technology) were justified as military preparedness.” [NYR 41]

Putting these two historical periods together — 1789-1939 and 1945-1975 — a truthful observer would say that U.S. economic strength derived from big government was based on theft and war. If we take into account how much war was involved in the early land thefts, we might conclude that the only thing big federal government has done to boost the economy in the entire 220 years since 1789 has been to wage war. Not so pretty a picture of American political economy after all.

Strangely enough, Parker concludes his review with a call for the federal government “first to save Wall Street and restore credit, and then to begin rebuilding the devastation Wall Street’s failure has left behind.” [41] Since credit cannot be conjured out of thin air, does this mean more land theft and more war? And what then for the devastation that financial success leaves behind?

Parker’s final sentence, “The challenge of creating a new era for government as long-term guarantor of our security and well-being lies ahead.” One wishes that “our security and well-being” could be founded on some new political economy, not the same old, same old, which, after all, is looking increasingly problematic on a global scale.

Still trying to kill the Indian

The New York Times reports that “Mexico’s public health authorities have concluded that the girls at the Children’s Village School are suffering from a mass psychogenic disorder. In layman’s language, they have a collective hysteria.” The school was founded in 1990 by a Catholic order, the Sisters of Mary. The students are girls from “some of Mexico’s poorest regions.” The girls are “tightly disciplined and very isolated.” The school’s director, Sister Margie Cheong, says: “Yes, the girls miss their families. But here we form character. A girl here is no longer an Indian girl from the mountains. She knows how to express herself, she knows how to smile. They have confidence.”

Does this sound familiar? It is a contemporary manifestation of the principle enunciated by Capt. Richard C. Pratt, who founded the U.S. Training and Industrial School at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, in 1879: “Kill the Indian … and save the man.” This was the intention behind the whole system of American Indian boarding schools in the U.S. and Canada. Take the child away from family community and “save” it for “civilization.”

Boarding school horror stories abound. A few students were happy with this “salvation.” One useful comprehensive resource on the subject is David Wallace Adams’, Education for Extinction: American Indians and the Boarding School Experience 1875-1928 (University of Kansas, 1995).

Is it a surprise that the girls in the Children’s Village School are hysterical? I don’t think so.

Blood Politics

The March 3, 2007, special election vote by the Cherokee Nation to remove citizenship from intermarried whites and descendants of freed African slaves has raised renewed examination of “blood politics.” As columnist Steve Newcomb points out in Indian Country Today, “The Cherokee Nation has received a great deal of heated criticism for its decision to eject the black freedman from their national rolls.” In a related column, Professor Eric Cheyfitz notes that “Cherokee Nation Principal Chief Chad Smith invoked the criteria of ‘blood’ as that which defines the boundaries of Indian nations. And yet in the same explanation, Smith denied the charge of racism….”

Some observers correlate American Indian citizenship disputes with struggles over resources, especially casino revenues. Whatever the motivations, identity politics is visible well beyond an American Indian context, in a variety of situations around the world. The Cherokee vote is an opportunity to look at assumptions behind notions of “race.”

The basic irony of racial politics in the modern world is that blood purity myths are sustained among mixed-blood peoples. The reality today is that humanity is a mixed-blood species. Race politics is a lie told within this truth.

Take a look at some blood myths within the American context:

1. Black blood, the blood of the slaves imported from Africa, is very strong; a few drops are sufficient to make someone black. The “octoroons” of American slavery are an example of the mythical power of black blood: one-eighth black blood overcame seven-eighths white blood. This kind of thinking was very useful to white male slave-owners, who could increase their slave property by having intercourse with their female slaves. The labor-pains of these women produced more slaves to labor for the master.

2. Red blood, the blood of Indigenous Peoples in the Americas, is comparatively weak in relation to white; a single dose of white blood was sufficient to make someone a “half-breed”; one more dose produced the one-fourth blood-quantum that became a common federal definition of Indian identity. The 1887 Dawes Allotment Act used this standard to dismember the Cherokee Nation and remove land from Cherokee control.

3. White blood is perhaps the most mythical of all; its purity and strength, though powerful in relation to “red” blood, are vulnerable to virtually all others. This was the reasoning behind anti-miscegenation laws criminalizing interracial dating and marriage nearly into the 21st century. (In a strange variation on color, the rarest form of white blood is blue blood, a type of divine origin preserved among the nobility; it is so weak it has to be protected against mixture with non-noble whites.)

Blood myths parade as biology, but they are ideologies wrapped in the language of genetics. Racism is a type of politics that pretends to be a part of nature. Whether in Bosnia or the Cherokee Nation, under colonialism or a slave regime, in domestic or international arenas, race politics is the same. Mixed-blood humanity is burdened with racial metaphysics.

In a 1909 naturalization case [In Re Halladjian, 174 Federal Reporter 834], a federal court admitted four Armenians to United States citizenship, over an objection of the federal government that the petitioners were not “white.” The judge’s reasoning, based on extensive analysis of history and statutes, is still startling, almost a century later:

We find, then, that there is no European or white race, as the United States contends, and no Asiatic or yellow race which includes substantially all the people of Asia; that the mixture of races in western Asia for the last 25 centuries raises doubt if its individual inhabitants can be classified by race…. We find, further, that the word “white” has generally been used in the federal and in the state statutes, in the publications of the United States, and in its classification of its inhabitants, to include all persons not otherwise classified…. [845]

The judge saw white privilege as it is: an historical construct, a catchall category rooted in politics, not biology. Further, in response to the government’s argument that “white” referred to “the prevailing ideals, standards, and aspirations of the people of Europe,” [837] the judge stated:

… a reasonable modesty may well remind Europeans that the origin of their letters was in Phoenicia, the origin of much of their art in Egypt, that Asia Minor claimed, at least, the birthplace of the first great European poet, and that the Christian religion, which most Europeans believe to have influenced their civilization and ideals, was born in Palestine. [840]

Imagine how much less conflict we would see today if this “reasonable modesty” were borne in mind! We would have to acknowledge that “race” and “blood quantum” are tools for oppression, with no redeeming social value, for the Cherokee Nation or any other nation or people.

****
I wrote an earlier version of some of these thoughts for Interracial Voice, in response to the O.J. Simpson case: O.J.’s Blood

Palestinian Youth – to start again

Re: “Years of Strife and Lost Hope Scar Young Palestinian Lives” (The New York Times, 12 March 2007): Steven Erlanger reports of the youthful fighters that “All of them want to leave and start again, somewhere.”

Intriguing to compare this sentiment with the attitude of a “Galilean pioneer” in Arthur Koestler’s novel, “Thieves in the Night”: “We don’t want to change and we don’t want to improve, we want to begin from the beginning.”

It seems by now the government of Israel would have learned the ultimate futility of forcible ghettoization. That which inspired revolutionary actions in Zionist history is likely to have the same effect on others today.

Probably there will never be sustainable government (let alone democracy) where walls and ghettos are necessary.

Clans and state – Somaliland

Yesterday’s The New York Times reports on “The Other Somalia: An Island of Stability in a Sea of Armed Chaos” (7 March 2007, A11).

The gist of the article is that Somaliland (the northern part of Somalia) has achieved peace and social stability through an integration of tribal, clan and national institutions. In contrast, the rest of Somalia, trying to organize via Western-style (and supported) governance, continues to be in chaos. The 19th century colonial pasts of these two regions partly explains the present situation: Somaliland went to the British, who, in their fashion of “indirect rule,” relied on pre-existing clan chiefs; Somalia went to the Italians, who brought thousands of administrators to rule directly. After decolonization in 1960, the two regions merged, but only Somaliland was able to sustain a viable government; Somalia collapsed into violence, from which it has not yet emerged.

Law & Society scholars and others have long discussed the differences between clan and state systems. Some relegate clan organizations to the realm of historical anthropology, while others focus on contemporary clan systems in so-called “less developed” societies. Only a few regard tribe and clan as relevant to “advanced” societies. The Times article is valuable for its display of the historical picture as a foundation for contemporary political process.

Though the Times article makes no mention of Iraq or Afghanistan, we may understand that each of those countries has a historical foundation of clan governance. In Iraq, this becomes occasionally visible in the proposals for partitioning into three areas; in Afghanistan, almost every report acknowledges the clan structure, in then guise of “warlords.”

To the extent that we comprehend clan and tribe as historical and contemporary phenomena, we may better investigate how and when and where these modes of social organization may not only help provide, but be necessary ingredients for peace and stability. Where these modes have been destroyed, we may be in the position of Humpty Dumpty: “All the King’s horses and all the King’s men couldn’t put him back again.”

***
After I wrote this note, I read Rory Stewart’s Op-Ed piece about Afghanistan and Iraq in the same issue of the Times: “The Value of Their Values”. Though he uses the term “values,” it’s clear from the text that he is referring to “social structures” as well as personal behaviors. His conclusion:

Our invective about state failure and our dissatisfaction have become part of the problem. Real solutions will emerge, often improbably, from local individual virtues, and from the cultures we struggle to describe and tend to ignore.

American Indian – a note on names

The name, “American Indians,” derives from the colonizers’ world-view; it is a name given to the Indigenous Peoples of the continent by outsiders and strangers. Most of us know the story: Columbus (his Spanish name gives away his secret: Cristobal Colon; the Christian colonizer) thought he was going to India, and, being a vain and self-important man, insisted he had found it; he named the people he met “Indians.” The “American” part came later, after everyone but Columbus admitted his error, and the continent had been named for another Italian navigator, Amerigo Vespucci.

In addition to naming entire Peoples, colonizers developed naming practices applied to individuals among these Peoples. One analysis describes “the renaming of Native Americans” as a “cultural project: to fashion and normalize a standard patriarchal family-system deemed suitable to [U.S. and Canadian] citizenship, property rights, and civilized, moral conduct.” [James C. Scott, John Tehranian, and Jeremy Mathias, “Government Surnames and Legal Identities,” in Carl Watner, ed., National Identification Systems (Jefferson, NC, and London: McFarland & Co., Inc., 2004). The analysis originally appeared as “The Production of Legal Identities Proper to States: The Case of the Permanent Family Surname,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 44:01, pp. 4-44 (January 2002); available at Cambridge Journals Online.]

An 1897 essay by the Superintendent of the U. S. Boarding School for Crow Indians, Montana, illustrates the cultural policy of “naming the Indians”: “The Indian Department has continually urged this matter upon its agents, superintendents, and other workers ‘in the field.’ The command to give names to the Indians and to establish the same as far as possible by continuous use has been a part of the ‘Rules and Regulations’ for years past. … In this thing, as in nearly all others, the Indians do not know what is best for them. They can’t see that our system has any advantages over their own, and they have fought stubbornly against the innovation.” [Frank Terry,” Naming the Indians,” American Monthly Review of Reviews (New York: March, 1897). This essay is available as an e-text from the University of Virginia Library Electronic Text Center.]

It is common to hear criticism of the name “American Indian,” coupled with an insistence on the use of “Native American,” which came into vogue as part of a late-20th century concern for “multiculturalism.” This was an effort to acknowledge ethnic diversity in the United States while insisting on an over-arching American unity. Under multicultural naming practice, people are identified as hyphen-American: African-American, Irish-American, Italian-American, and so on. For the indigenous inhabitants of the land, the correct term became Native-American.

“Native American,” however, faces dilemmas as serious as the name it was to displace. First, the word “native” has a generic meaning, referring to anyone or anything that is at home in its place of origin: anyone born in America is a native American. Even if we insist on the significance of an upper-case letter, we have to admit that Native American has an ordinary language problem. Second, as applied to Indigenous Peoples who have been subjected to colonialism, the word “native” has a culturally pejorative meaning, as in “The natives are restless tonight.” The word carries a connotation of “primitive,” which has both a generic definition, meaning “first” or “primary,” and a pejorative use, meaning “backward” or “ignorant.” Third, as we have seen, “American” is not an indigenous name, but derives from that other Italian.

“Native American” does not avoid the problem of naming from an outsider’s perspective. Moreover, multiculturally “correct” names focus on surface appearances, and may even obscure the demographic, political and economic situations of the named Peoples. As John Trudell observed when “Native American” first became fashionable, “They change our name and treat us the same.”

If we want to be true to the principle that a People’s name ought to come from them, we have to discard both “American Indian” and “Native American.” The consequence of this is that the original inhabitants ought to be called by whatever names they give themselves. There are no American Indians or Native Americans. There are many different Peoples, hundreds in fact, bearing such names as Wampanoag, Cherokee, Seminole, Navajo, Hopi, and so on.

But the conundrum doesn’t end here. Some apparently “real” names are not actually derived from the People themselves, but from their neighbors or even enemies. “Mohawk” is a Narraganset name meaning, “flesh eaters.” “Sioux” is a French corruption of an Anishinabe word for “enemy.” Similarly, “Apache” is a Spanish corruption of a Zuni word for “enemy,” while Navajo is from the Spanish version of a Tewa word. If we want to be fully authentic, we have to inquire into the language of each People to find the name they call themselves.

The important thing in naming is to acknowledge the fundamental difference between how a People view themselves and how others view them. In this context, it is not surprising to find that a People’s name for themselves is often a word for “People,” or for their homeland, or for some differentiating characteristic as seen through their own eyes.

It’s been asked, “What’s in a name?” Sometimes the answer is everything, as when the name is Rumplestiltskin; sometimes nothing, as with the rose, fragrant by any other name. N. Scott Momaday, in The Names: A Memoir, writes about the meaning of who we are that is contained and not contained in our names. Names are mysterious, sometimes revealing, sometimes concealing our identity or the identity of a People or place.

Names can have great power, and the power of naming is a great power. History and law, as well as literature and politics, are activities of naming. The Judeo-Christian Bible tells a story of God giving Adam the power to name the animals and other parts of Creation, a naming that signals a power over Creation. This story established a relation that became crucial in the encounters of Christianist colonizers with the inhabitants of the “New World.”

In studying Indigenous Peoples, we do not need to completely avoid incorrect or colonial terminology whose significance is widely understood. Indeed, the shortest way to penetrate the histories of Indigenous Peoples may be to analyze the names imposed on them by others. These names are part of world history, politics, and culture. As a component of “Indigenous Peoples Studies,” an inquiry into names can develop toward an understanding of nationhood, homelands, and self-determination.

Navajo Legal Services stories

Dinebeiina Nahiilna Be Agaditahe, the Navajo Nation Legal Services program, was my introduction to American Indian legal issues. I was one of the first attorneys hired in the Shiprock office, in 1968. Legal Services was one of the newest forms of law practice available at the time, part of Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society War on Poverty that the president hoped would somehow balance out or neutralize the War on Viet Nam. It was just the sort of thing I believed I could deal with, or at least survive, being pretty sure I couldn’t deal with or survive the kinds of practice most of my Yale Law School classmates were aiming for —big New York firms, Washington bureaucratic jobs, and judicial clerkships.

Little did I know that the Navajo —and not just their legal services program— would open my mind to ontological issues, circling around a central question: what does it mean to be a human being? The Navajo taught me that the questions I was asking myself were about life as much as about law. I went there looking for a chance to use law to do something useful and discovered that the question of usefulness is itself culturally determined. In fact, when I found out just how useless I felt as a lawyer for Navajos caught in the maze of Anglo laws, I simultaneously learned what my usefulness was from the point of view of Legal Services and the Great Society: I was part of a morality play, albeit a morality that was also political.

One might say that until the establishment of legal services the American legal system functioned without all the components necessary for due process. The law provides whatever process (and processes) legal theory and doctrine determine are needed for a complete and proper legal system; as the saying goes, due process means “all the process that is due.” Some processes are built into the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, such as trial by jury and the requirement that warrants be issued only upon probable cause. Even these are not static: court decisions continue to rework definitions of “jury” and “probable cause” and revise underlying concepts of “peers” and “searches.” Due process has changed even as the words in the Bill of Rights have remained the same.

The notion of a “right to a lawyer” is of comparatively recent origin, and then only with regard to criminal law. In civil law, there is not really any such right at all; but Great Society legislation of the late 1960s established programs to provide lawyers in civil cases, as part of the War on Poverty. The justification was that people who cannot afford lawyers are at a disadvantage in protecting their legal rights, and that this has economic consequences —the perpetuation of their poverty. The legal services programs of the Great Society were proposed as a legal means to an economic end: lawyers for poor people would help eliminate poverty and thereby enhance the overall economy.

Whatever their economic merit, legal services programs certainly had political repercussions: aggressive lawyers, mostly young idealists, brought lawsuits challenging “business as usual.” In many instances, lawyers’ efforts were coordinated with the work of community organizers, who scouted for likely clients and used the possibility of litigation as an organizing tool.

My first week in Shiprock —then the Navajo community most engulfed by surrounding Anglo economy— brought me potential cases for challenging business practices that discriminated against Navajos and took advantage of their poverty. These cases could be vehicles for changing the legal landscape, not by adding any new due process, but by implementing the processes that were available to anyone who had access to a lawyer. One of these early cases stands out in my memory: the car dealer case. It reinforced lessons learned in law school: about how absurd law can be, and how significant is possession (“nine-tenths of the law”).

The car dealer and the stationery

In 1968, there were no car dealers in Shiprock, or, so far as I know, anywhere else in Navajoland. Navajos who bought cars went off-reservation —in this case, primarily to the town of Farmington, New Mexico. There, they were treated as second-class citizens, tolerated only for the money they might spend. This racism against Navajos in the border towns around Navajoland surprises visitors from the East Coast, where American Indians (or, more recently, Native Americans —more on that in another post) are viewed through the twin filters of time and distance, through which they appear as grand historical characters. Up close and in the present, in Farmington, Navajos were viewed as less than fully human, or, if human, as less than fully developed (the development standard is Anglo, acquisitive, boomer).

A Navajo car buyer, in Farmington, is an opportunity for easy profit. The system was honed to a routine; it depended on common legal practices and contract provisions that we set out to challenge through a class action lawsuit. A class action is group litigation: one or a few individuals are named as plaintiffs and are alleged to represent other individuals similarly situated, who are too numerous to name. The first step toward a class action is awareness that we are observing a practice that affects large numbers of people, raises a common pattern of facts, and implicates the same or similar legal issues.

Time and again, within the first few weeks, I heard stories of automobile repossessions based on failure to make payments under contracts that called for a “balloon payment” —a large, usually final, payment at the end of a long series of smaller monthly payments. The balloon payment is almost a guarantee of default, in the context of poverty: the immediate promise of “easy payments” combines with the perennial hope that things will get better, to entice a buyer into signing what almost inevitably turns out to be an impossible agreement. In New Haven, I had seen furniture store contracts with balloon payments structured to allow repossession of every item of furniture if default in payment occurred with regard to any single item.

Farmington car dealers sold and repossessed the same cars over and over; we could document this with our clients’ papers. Each car was like a goldmine, producing profit until it literally collapsed. Even a crash produced profit, because the contracts required the buyer to purchase insurance. We knew that balloon payments had been successfully challenged in other jurisdictions as “unconscionable” under the Uniform Commercial Code. We thought we had a chance to win that argument here; we at least wanted a chance to try.

A lawsuit requires a client; among the many people who came to the office with car repossessions —and sometimes with demands for payments after repossession, to fulfill the terms of the contract— I began to work with a few whom we felt would be best able to withstand the difficulties of a trial. I wanted clients whose particular fact situations would show the most egregious aspects of the practice. Many of our clients spoke only Navajo —and, indeed, this was one factor we thought might weigh as a special element of inequity in the face of greedy car dealers. I worked with our interpreters —Tribal Court Advocates who were fluent in English and Navajo and extremely creative at explaining legal concepts that are exotic even to Anglos— to build a group of plaintiffs who understood and supported what we were trying to do.

Our filing of the class action provoked immediate response in the local Bar Association. At one Bar luncheon, I was accosted by the attorney for the biggest of the car dealers we had sued; he railed at me for being an agitator, stirring up Navajos who had never complained before and who were in fact grateful for the services provided by his client. I was taken aback by this display of personal animosity, having been conditioned to seeing the law profession as a kind of club, where friendships or at least civility prevail in spite of diverging client interests. The local District Attorney, a remarkable example of the professional ideal —he implemented practices to respect defendant’s rights well before the Supreme Court mandated these in criminal law— came to my defense and to counsel me not to worry, saying, “That guy always takes his client’s cases personally.”

I knew that I was taking my client’s cases personally, in the sense that injustices and discrimination directed at them pained me, and I knew that I could be angry about these; but somehow —in ways I sometimes see as a moral defect rather than a strength— I wanted to be able to discuss these problems, even with my adversaries, rather than fight. Fighting, arguing, trying to prove what is obvious to me —these are debilitating experiences. I am continually amazed that I am drawn again and again into social conflict, almost as a duty or a moral obligation, when all I want is to be free of it. In this way, the law has always both repelled and attracted me.

Around this same time, an unrelated and obscure event was occurring in the legal world. The New Mexico Bar Ethics Committee had decided to take up the question whether the Navajo Legal Services Program was engaged in unethical advertising. This was prior to the revision of the American Bar Association prohibition on lawyer advertising, a long-standing part of the tradition that law is a profession and professionals do not advertise. The specific question before the Committee was raised by a complaint from a member of the bar who asserted that the English translation of Dinebeiina Nahiilna Be Agaditahe, the program’s Navajo name, constituted advertising. He asserted that the English phrase at the bottom of our stationery, “lawyers who work for the economic revitalization of the people,” was descriptive of all lawyers and therefore could be advertised by none. After some deliberation, and against the contentions of our program director that the phrase was not descriptive of all lawyers and that in any event it was only a translation of a name, the Committee decided that the English phrase was unethical and could no longer be displayed anywhere.

Meanwhile, the defendants in our car dealer case moved to dismiss, on a variety of grounds, including an assertion that our office was engaged in unethical practice. I knew that the structure of legal services programs had been attacked in other jurisdictions, though not successfully, under old common law doctrines of “champerty and maintenance,” which prohibit third-party financing of a lawsuit. The argument was that the government was funding legal services; it, not the named plaintiff, was the actual client; and the lawyer-client relationship was therefore violated. I prepared to argue that these ethical doctrines did not prevent the government from providing legal services, that this was not the financing of lawsuits, but the provision of a social service.

When the day came that we were in court, I heard the accusation of unethical practice and began to puzzle at what was being said. The defendant’s lawyer was not arguing about the attorney-client relationship or even the grounds of the lawsuit, but was saying something about the stationery on which our court papers were filed. After several moments of bewilderment, I realized that the car dealer attorney was referring to the Bar Ethics Committee decision and saying that our lawsuit should be dismissed because it was filed on unethical stationery! Every page of the pleadings stated the name and address of the law office, with the English translation appearing below the Navajo name. This, the attorney argued, was in clear violation of the recent ruling of the Bar Ethics Committee and should be stopped by this court. Nothing I said was sufficient to prevent the court from granting the motion to dismiss on the spot. There was no leave given to refile on different paper; no way out of filing a new complaint and waiting for a new hearing date on the court calendar.

It is hard to explain something like this to a client, let alone a client for whom the whole Anglo legal process appears as an invasion from another world. Fortunately, another event had occurred in the legal world —this one related to car dealers and not at all obscure: the Navajo Nation had enacted a law banning self-help repossession of automobiles. Self-help reposession means the dealer simply finds and tows away the car. The new law required a Tribal Court order to allow repossession. We still nurtured the idea of a class action suit in state court against the dealers, but now we had an accessible individual remedy in Tribal Court: a client could challenge balloon payment contracts and other such devices in a Navajo court, blocking repossession in the meantime.

Like other legal remedies, the Navajo law on repossession could be effective only to the extent it could be enforced. At first, car dealers continued their old ways and clients were not aware of the new law; by the time a client found out about the requirement for a court order, the car was back on the lot in Farmington, out of Tribal Court jurisdiction.

One afternoon, one of my favorite clients, a man whose energy and enthusiasm for life were palpable, arrived in the office, out of breath and in agitation. He said he might be in trouble. He had been riding into Shiprock with his brother and seen a tow truck with his pickup hitched behind, heading toward Farmington. He told his brother to turn around and give chase, until they came abreast of the truck and forced it to stop. My client told me he pulled out a gun and ordered the driver to unhitch the pickup, which the man did. He then watched the truck drive away and drove his own pickup to my office. I was elated; at last, self-help on our side of the law. It was unorthodox, to be sure, but it saved the truck and gave us a chance to enforce the new law.

Within an hour, I got a call from the car dealer himself, spluttering, “Your guy pulled a gun on my guy.” He demanded some sort of satisfaction. I, relying on attorney-client privilege, said I didn’t know what happened, but assured him that if his agent again attempted to repossess any vehicle without an order from Tribal Court, we would take steps to impound his tow truck. I told my client I thought he was safe and that we were prepared to enforce the new law, if there were another attempt. I never heard of another attempt and I think of this as the case we won on that issue.

Prison at Night: Native Spirituality Behind Bars

I first visited the Native American Circle at MCI Gardner, a Massachusetts prison, to meet the inmates and discuss possible litigation to protect American Indian spiritual practices.

Slow Turtle

Slow Turtle, the Wampanoag Medicine Man and Executive Director of the Massachusetts Commission on Indian Affairs, had invited me to the Circle this night to see for myself the program he had initiated. The following morning, I wrote this memoir of the visit.

******

Prison at night is all light—not stars or moon, but floodlight—orange-bright, glinting off razor-tipped concertina wire atop high fences: a boundary of steel and light. Two rows of fences separate a clear-zone perimeter, a no-man’s land like the Israeli or Berlin wall or any other high-insecurity border. Lights glare against the buildings and reflect from snow into sky, obliterating stars and moon. Denial of night vision, of night darkness, is one of the pains inflicted on the incarcerated.

Guards and dogs patrol at the edge of the orange glow, where earth’s night overwhelms even the brightest man-made lamps. A guard directs me to park in the lot behind the trees, leaving the front of the building for official vehicles. He is curious, cautious for any sudden strangeness beyond the ordinary strangeness of an unknown visitor. The dog hangs on its leash like any dog, sniffing, panting, and waiting for any command.

A small crowd of family visitors mills in the lobby, waiting to be called to pass through the “trap”—the search and metal detector—into the prison interior. I peer through the lobby to the heavy glass partition behind which two guards converse as if there were no one waiting to enter, as if there were nothing to do but chat. I suddenly remember that these guards will ask for my ID. My wallet is in the car (because cash is contraband within the prison), so I turn and leave, wondering whether this will attract the guards’ attention. I suspect they are watching more carefully than they appear, their indifference being a studied attitude.

A driver’s license is the normal form of identification, with its state seal and photo. My bar association card might be a trump card, alerting them to the possibility that I have a right of access, more clout than a family member. I take both, and leave my keys under the seat because they too are contraband. Institution rules permit only what is “essential”—whatever that may mean to a guard at the gate—so my glasses will not be challenged and my pen may not, but cash and keys would be.

Despite my precautions, the guard at the trap challenges the ring I am wearing: turquoise in silver with a Navajo Yei figure on each side. It once belonged to my son Julian and I wear it as a small remembrance of his life.

“Is it religious?”

“Yes, it is.”

The guard pauses; “OK, you can keep it.”

I save the story of my son. The guard doesn’t need it. Perhaps spiritual stories cannot be told. Perhaps they are beyond the rules.

Or are they?

This is the question that has led me to visit the prison tonight. I have come to attend the Native Circle—to share in its observance, and to hear the grievances of its members. The prison authorities have subjected the Circle to edicts and reversals regarding ceremonial practices and objects. Headbands, drums, smudge sticks, sweet grass braids, tobacco, and the ceremonial pipe have been alternately allowed and prohibited, subject to varying views and attitudes of different superintendents, commissioners, and governors.

Native Americans’ lives have been circumscribed for decades and centuries by reservation boundaries and special government regulations. Their spiritual practices are a lightning rod for politics, especially about land, the fulcrum of Native spirituality.

Inside prison, almost any spiritual practice can trigger an issue of “institutional security.” Spirituality in prison is the classic contest between God and Caesar, between the “now” of cosmic eternity and the “now” of alarmed gates and floodlit barriers.

For reasons embedded in the historical battle between Christian colonists and Indigenous Peoples, Native spirituality attracts more than its fair share of controversy within prison. A major source of trouble is the absence of an institutional hierarchy of Native spiritual authority. Native spirituality recognizes Medicine People, but Medicine People are not credentialed like priests and ministers. In an important sense, Native spirituality is not “religion” at all. It offers no parallel to the institutional structure of churches, no bureaucratic reference point for prison administration.

In this Massachusetts prison, different superintendents have presented differing perceptions of threat to security. So far, none has been able to find a way to accept a “sweat lodge,” though prisons elsewhere accommodate this important purification ceremony.

Part of the problem with administration has to do with objects. A perhaps more crucial part is the prison’s attempt to restrict Native practices to inmates who are “officially recognized Indians.”

There are two issues: one is a person’s right to engage in spiritual practices—to wear garments, use objects, eat food, make and display images. The other is the right to practice whatever spirituality one finds meaningful. These two issues are most often bound together, as for example when a Roman Catholic inmate wants to carry a rosary. With Native spirituality, however, administrators often separate the issues, questioning not only a particular practice—wearing a headband, for example—but also the right of a particular individual to engage in that practice. I have never heard of objection to an inmate’s request to meet with a priest or a rabbi on the grounds of lack of baptismal record or proof of Jewish blood, but it is often the case that a request to meet with a Medicine Person is denied on grounds of lack of “Indian blood” or “tribal identification.”

When law is exerted against spiritual practices in the United States, Constitutional questions arise—First Amendment freedom of religion, Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection. Law is articulated around issues of human behavior—what is the proper way to behave? Spirituality is articulated around ontological issues—what does it mean to be? Not surprisingly, courts tend to side with claims about behavior when these conflict with claims about being.

An inmate wears a sacred Native headband. The superintendent calls it a disguise, or says it is unsanitary, or that it may provoke rivalry with another inmate. The court says the superintendent’s view is “reasonable” and that “reasonableness” is all that is necessary under the Constitution. Yet, in fact, the headband is too small for an effective disguise, while woolen caps are not prohibited and would make excellent disguises, and a sacred skullcap is permitted for another religion. There is, moreover, no evidence of any rivalry about headgear, and cleanliness of all clothing is equally a concern or no concern. Do these facts not matter because they were not presented to the court or because the court did not find “unreasonableness” in them?

These questions are in my mind as I wait to be processed through the “trap.” I have given the guards my driver’s license, not wanting to alert them to my legal interests, wanting to see what happens to a regular visitor to the Circle. The search is routine, polite; they inspect my coat, belt, boots, and pockets. I joke that they could shine the boots; laughter is sometimes more effective than officiousness at locked gates. The far door is opened, and a guard escorts me across the yard to an interior building, where the Circle meets.

I wonder, as I walk, what else has been imposed here—will there be sage to purify the Circle, tobacco to smoke in the prayer pipe?

“Name?”

It is the guard inside the new building. He finds my name on a list and directs me to the third floor where the Circle is being held.

In the third floor hall, two men are standing, conversing. They look casual, but I sense they are waiting for me. I ask for the room. “All the way to the end.” As I pass them, I smell sage and sweet grass. I smile, and my heart opens. The Circle will be clean. Not everything has been taken away. A few moments after I enter the room, the two from the hall join the Circle. They had been waiting for me. They were guarding the purification of the Circle.

The chief and sub-chief—who have corresponded with me—greet me with a hand-to-forearm grip and an arm clasp around the back.

“Greetings! And thank you for coming!”

“Glad to be here!”

I walk around the room, greeting and being greeted. Someone makes a place for me in the Circle: my first face-to-face meeting with these people, after a year helping Slow Turtle, the Wampanoag Medicine Man, in his efforts to push back the bureaucratic roadblocks that threaten this Circle.

One of the men points out that more than half the men are wearing headbands, some beaded or painted, now that a confiscation has been reversed under pressure from Slow Turtle.

“The superintendent was pissed. He told us that we had better ‘learn to march to his drum.'”

“Is he aware of what he said? Does ‘drum’ mean anything to him?” They laugh at my reference to the sacred instrument.

They tell me the superintendent has not limited himself to attacking Native spirituality, but attacks birds, flowers, and trees as well.

“All the bird houses in the yard have been removed and a patch of sunflowers cut down, for ‘security reasons.’ Forty trees were cut down or lopped off above the trunk.”

I am amazed. Are there actually “reasons” for this? Is anything the superintendent calls “security” a reason? Is his obvious insecurity in relation to the natural world a valid “security” concern for the institution?

I eventually tell my story: “It’s been more than twenty years since I first got involved with American Indian legal issues. That’s when I began to understand the spiritual basis of life. My education prepared me to do legal work, but it was a dead weight on my spirit. I had to learn the difference between being a good person and being in a ‘good’ role in the system. As a lawyer, I can see inside the law, but my spiritual perceptions make me a critic of what I see.”

The meeting is not only about complaints. Several men tell stories about friendly guards, cooperative superintendents. The predominant theme of their stories is how the Circle has changed them for the good. One after another tells me, “I was a rebel in the prison, violent and angry.” “I had constant disciplinary reports.” “I don’t act out any more, because I learned to deal with anger and pain in a different way.” “I know that the guards want me to get mad; it ‘feeds’ them and justifies their anger.”

The lives of these men are evidence that the Circle has reshaped their understanding of what it means to be human, though incarcerated. We talk about the situation in states where “sweat lodges” are allowed in prison, where prison authorities marvel at the reduction in inmate violence and the surge of inmate learning that follows from Purification and other ceremonies. Why is this prison administration so recalcitrant? Is it only the craziness of this superintendent, or is it also the politics of a governor and a public who feed on stereotypes of crime, who need to reinforce these stereotypes in order to reinforce their own self-images as powerful, successful, deserving people?

I am pleased to be pulled back from complaints. I fear my habits as a lawyer might cannibalize the good of the Circle this night, focusing energy on wrongs and rights rather than on mutual fellowship and integrity that the Circle provides.

“No amount of legal action can accomplish anything unless the reality of this Circle is maintained.”

Several of them smile, and assure me they are not “bummed out” by the discussion of problems, and have not lost sight of the Circle.

A couple men get up and start serving coffee and dessert: Food for the body as for the spirit. The Chief fills a pipe, lights it, and offers prayers to the directions. He passes it around the Circle. A final prayer follows, for those who are sick or in other need, homeless, or hungry—prayers in the traditional way, not for oneself but for others.

Out of the room, down to the door, waiting for the escort guard, I share a few last comments. Some of the men stay behind to clean up and pack the ceremonial items. I walk into the false brightness of the yard with the escort, followed by most of the men now. The Chief is drumming softly behind me. I turn at the final drumbeat.

“Aho!”

I wave and leave them, returning to the true darkness of the night outside the prison walls.

* * *

Trapp, et al. v. DuBois, et al., Massachusetts Superior Ct., Civil No. 95-0779, Appeals Court, No. 2000-P-1640, was filed in April 1995. In March 2003, the case was settled according to the terms of a court-ordered Agreement. In July 2003, the first Purification Lodge ceremonies were held in three Massachusetts prisons.

What happened at court

I received a notice from the Superior Court of a hearing on a motion for contempt filed by Randall Shield Wolf Trapp, lead plaintiff in the lawsuit that had won protection for Native American Indian religious practices in Massachusetts prisons. Shield Wolf had filed the motion pro se, “for himself,” without representation, so it’s unusual that I got a notice to appear. More unusual is the fact that I had been an attorney pro hac vice in the case, meaning that I am not a member of the Massachusetts Bar, but was admitted for the purposes of this case only, on motion by my co-counsel, Robert Doyle, who is a member; but Bob didn’t get a notice of this hearing!

We figured something was screwy, but we went to court. We got the papers from the clerk and saw what Shield Wolf had filed: a motion to show cause why the Department of Corrections (DOC) should not be held in contempt of the court-ordered Agreement, because it has prohibited the use of tobacco in the kinnickkinnick mixture (for smoking and in Medicine bundles). The Agreement states that religious ceremonies in the prisons shall be based upon Wampanoag traditions. Shield Wolf’s motion argued that a tobacco mixture is in accord with Wampanoag tradition.

We saw that the court had issued a habeas writ, ordering the DOC to bring Shield Wolf to court for the hearing. When we looked for him, however, we found he had not been brought to court. We were disappointed not to see him. He is a thoughtful person, whose conversation always opens philosophical vistas. He had been the inmate leader of the original Native American Circle at the time the original litigation began.

Bob and I went to the courtroom at the scheduled time, to see what might happen and what, if anything, we could do. Staff Attorney Joan Kennedy appeared for the DOC. The judge, Ernest Murphy, told the court officer to find Shield Wolf, but he could not be found; he was not in the building and there was no information about his whereabouts. The judge took no action to enforce his habeas order, and, instead, said he wanted to “have a discussion” about the motion. He recognized that neither Bob nor I represented Shield Wolf, but said, since we were familiar with the case he wanted to explore the Constitutional and Native American religious issues. We said we had only seen the motion that morning; the DOC attorney said she had not seen it at all. The judge told her to “calm down,” and handed her the court’s copy and said she should read it and then speak to it. We had a few minutes break while she read the motion and looked through her whole file, making notes. When she was ready, the court reconvened.

The judge asked Kennedy to speak first. She talked about the Native Circle being in existence a long time, and said it was working well. She said she had spoken to the Superintendent at Gardner prison recently and been told there were no complaints about anything with the Circle. She said tobacco was not mentioned specifically in the Agreement, and that the proper route for complaints was not a contempt hearing, but through the DOC Religious Services Committee. Then she said that one of the names on a Circle member list looked like a Muslim name.

Bob and I both spoke. We pointed out this was a pro se matter, that we had not entered appearances at this hearing, and that Shield Wolf was doing a good job with the motion and should be provided an opportunity for a hearing through enforcement of the habeas. I said the DOC attorney was confusing different prisons, that Shield Wolf was at Norfolk, not Gardner, that I was aware of many complaints from Native Circles in several prisons that had been made to the Religious Services Committee with no results, and that a contempt hearing was appropriate. I also said the remark about a Muslim name seemed irrelevant to the issue and designed to arouse suspicion in the current political climate.

The judge said, “Where there’s smoke, there’s fire.” I heard this as an acknowledgment of a problem with the smoking mixture, but he refused to get involved. He said nothing about the ignored habeas. He said the existence of other complaints meant this motion is only the “tip of the iceberg” and anything he ruled would not end the overall troubles. He said Shield Wolf should take the matter to the Appeals Court, since it had ordered the settlement Agreement. I pointed out that the Agreement says it shall be enforceable in Superior Court; the judge said that didn’t matter. I argued that the other issues were not before him — only the motion from Shield Wolf — and he said again it didn’t matter. He denied the motion.

We were very upset, and walked out without waiting for Attorney Kennedy. On the way home, we talked about various options for Shield Wolf. Before I could bring myself to write about those, I wrote the prose poem. It got much off my chest.