Monthly Archives: April 2015

Wagner in Linguistics, Fri. 4/17 at 3:30pm

Michael Wagner of McGill University will give a colloquium talk titled “Additivity and the syntax of ‘even'” in the Linguistics department this Friday, 17 April at 3:30pm in ILC N400. All are welcome. Abstract follows.

Additivity and the syntax of ‘even’
Beaver & Clark (2003, 2010) observe that certain focus operators such as ‘only’ and ‘even’ differ in various ways from focus sensitive operators such as ‘always’. This talk presents analysis that derives at least some of these differences from a difference in their syntax: ‘only’ takes two syntactic arguments, a focus constituent which can be of any type, and a second argument, which has to compose with the first to form a proposition (following similar syntactic proposals in Rooth 1985, Mccawley 1995, Krifka 1996). The distribution of ‘only’ is further constrained by a constraint that assures that the size of the focus constituent must minimized (potentially motivated semantically, as proposed in Wagner 2006). Adverbs like ‘always’, by contrast, operate over a single argument.

A challenges to this view is the syntax of ‘even’, which seem to place it between the two categories of focus operators. We can get a better understanding of the syntax of ‘even’ once we control for whether ‘even’ is used additively or not. Whether ‘even’ carries an additive presupposition remains controversial. While Horn (1969), Karttunen and Peters (1979), Wilkinson (1996) and many others have argued that it does, Stechow (1991), Krifka (1992) and Rullmann (1997) reached the opposite conclusion. This talk identifies a new syntactic generalization about when ‘even’ triggers an additive presupposition, which provides further evidence for the analysis of the syntax of focus operators advocated here. It also reconciles the contradictory findings about additivity in the earlier literature.  The analysis offers a new perspective on syntactic constraints on the distribution of related focus operators in German noted in Jacobs (1983) and Büring & Hartmann (2001).

DeGraff at Freeman Lecture, Fri. 4/10 at 3:30 p.m.

Michel DeGraff of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology will be presenting on Kreyol Pale, Kreyol Konprann: Power/knowledge at the Crossroads of History, Linguistics & Education in Haiti in the Freeman Lecture in ILC N151 at 3:30 p.m. Friday, April 10. Everyone is welcome.

DeGraff specializes in syntax, morphology, language change, Creole studies, Haitian Creole, education in Haiti, and the linguistics-ideology interface. In his Freeman Lecture, he will discuss his participation in and the rationale, accomplishments and prospects of the MIT-Haiti Initiative, which is a project for the development, evaluation and dissemination of active-learning resources in Kreyòl (the national language of Haiti and one of its two official languages) to improve science, technology, engineering and math (STEM) education plus leadership and management in Haiti.

Loewer at Philosophy Colloquium, Fri. 4/10 at 3:30 p.m.

Barry Loewer of Rutgers University will be presenting The Mentaculus Vision in the UMass Philosophy Colloquium in Bartlett 206 at 3:30 p.m. Friday, April 10. Everyone is welcome – a description* of his work is below:

I will describe a proposal for the structure for a fundamental physical theory that makes connections between statistical mechanics, cosmology, the metaphysics of time, laws, objective probabilities, counterfactuals and causation, and some issues in epistemology.

*This is the abstract for a talk of the same name that he was supposed to give at Rutgers last week. An abstract for the current talk is not posted.

Chen at Cognitive Brown Bag, Weds. 4/8 at noon

Tina Chen (PhD Candidate in PBS) will be presenting Not just noise: Individual differences in response bias in memory and reasoning in the Cognitive Brown Bag series in Tobin 521B at noon Wednesday, April 8. Everyone is welcome – the abstract is below.

Abstract: Response bias is a component of decision-making that can be defined as the general willingness to respond a certain way. For example, in recognition memory, one can have a response bias towards responding that a test item has been previously studied, or in reasoning, one can have a response bias towards responding that a conclusion is logically valid. However, not all individuals have the same response bias. Indeed, there is some evidence that response bias is a stable cognitive trait in memory that differs across individuals (Kantner & Lindsay, 2012, 2014). One predictor of this trait may be cognitive ability, since it appears to predict response bias in memory (Zhu et al., 2010) and in reasoning (e.g., Handley & Trippas, 2015). While memory and reasoning have similar decision-making components and may be very related (e..g, Heit & Hayes, 2011; Heit, Rotello, & Hayes, 2012), this experiment will be the first to demonstrate whether cognitive ability predicts response bias in both tasks. Preliminary findings will be presented.

Frank Keil 5 College CogSci Speaker April 23

From Andrew Cohen

The Five College Cognitive Science Speaker Series is pleased to announce a talk by Frank Keil.

  • Date: Thurs. April 23
  • Time: 1-2pm
  • Location: TBA (UMass)
  • Title: The Growth of Explanatory Insight: Causal Understanding and the Outsourced Mind
  • Abstract: Despite having highly impoverished understandings of the world at the mechanistic level, children and adults alike have strong interests in mechanistic explanations. These seemingly futile interests in mechanisms may in fact support the development of everyday understandings by enabling even the very young to build a sense of causal patterns that exist far above the level of mechanisms. That sense of causal patterns then works in combination with strategies for identifying and evaluating both experts and their explanations, enabling lay people of all ages to supplement their highly incomplete knowledge by accessing and relying on the divisions of cognitive labor that exist in all cultures. Illusions of explanatory depth and insight, as well as biases concerning distribution of knowledge across minds, create a false impression of the nature of folk science. Studies on the development of folk science in children, however, offer a more cognitively feasible account for all ages and levels of expertise.
  • Webpage: http://psychology.yale.edu/people/frank-keil

More information will be provided closer to the date.

If you are interested in meeting with the speaker, please email me (acohen@psych.umass.edu).