(i)         Some critics of race-based public policies (such as affirmative action) think that they exacerbate, and even cause, racial divisiveness and excessive racial consciousness. Why does Loury think that such critics get things backwards? (pp. 141-147)

(ii)       Why does Loury think that at the most profound moral level, someone who abhors the consequences of racial stigma has to affirm a kind of moral blindness to the race of agents? (You will have to figure this one out yourself as Loury himself doesn’t explain why!) (p. 148)

(iii)     Loury thinks that there are three domains of public action where the “blindness” of liberal neutrality might be applied. Describe each of these three domains and why, in the name of liberal neutrality, one may argue that they need to be “colorblind”. (This relates to the “profound moral level” of the previous question.) (pp. 148-149)

(iv)     (a) Give examples from each of these three domains of when and why the principle of race-blindness may be questionable. (pp. 149-151) (b) Loury thinks that the race-blindness of the first domain fails because, as he describes it, it is not closed to moral deviation. What does he mean? (p. 151) (c) In regards to the second domain he thinks that it should be race-blind, but not race-indifferent. What does he mean? (pp. 151-152) (d) The only domain where he thinks that some notion of race-blindness should be elevated to the level of fundamental principle is the third domain. Why? (p. 152)